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Abstract—In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal
cache placement under secrecy constraints in heterogeneous
networks, where small-cell base stations are equipped with caches
to reduce the overall backhaul load. For two models for eaves-
dropping attacks, we formally derive the necessary conditions for
secrecy and we derive the corresponding achievable backhaul
rate. In particular we formulate the optimal caching schemes
with secrecy constraints as a convex optimization problem. We
then thoroughly investigate the backhaul rate performance of the
heterogeneous network with secrecy constraints using numerical
simulations. We compare the system performance with and
without secrecy constraints and we analyze the influence of the
system parameters, such as the file popularity, size of the library
files and the capabilities of the small-cell base stations, on the
overall performance of our optimal caching strategy. Our results
highlight the considerable impact of the secrecy requirements on
the overall caching performance of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Caching content at the wireless edge, as proposed in [1], is a
promising technique for future 5G wireless networks [2]. The
concept of edge caching stems from the idea of significantly
reducing the backhaul usage and thus the latency in content
retrieval by bringing the content closer to the end users.
Exploiting the new capabilities of future multi-tier networks,
numerous recent works have investigated the potential benefits
of caching data in densely deployed small-cell base stations
(SBS) equipped with storage capabilities [3], [4].
One important perspective to study the performance lim-
its and trade-offs of caching in wireless networks is the
information-theoretic perspective, which has gained consid-
erable traction in recent years. In [5], caching metrics are
defined and analyzed for large networks, while in [6], the
authors study the fundamental performance limits of caching
using network coding techniques. Other approaches have been
investigated to analyze caching networks, e.g. in [7] where the
problem of optimal placement of cached content is studied
in terms of outage probability. Another particularly important
performance measure for edge caching is the overall energy
consumption, or equivalently the energy efficiency of the
network. Numerous works have investigated the performance
of caching from an energy perspective: in [8] it was shown
that caching at the edge can provide significant gains in terms
of energy efficiency while in [9], the authors study the tradeoff
between transport and caching energy.
However there exists a performance metric for edge caching
networks which has not been studied in the literature yet,
namely the secrecy metric. Indeed, while secrecy concerns in
various wireless networks have been thoroughly investigated
in the past decade, see e.g. [10] for various topics on secrecy in
wireless networks, and while several works have investigated
secrecy in heterogeneous networks (HetNets), see e.g. [11],
the interest in the secrecy of HetNets with caching has
only grown recently. In [12] secrecy in caching networks is
investigated from an information-theoretic perspective using
network coding, while in [13] the secrecy of device-to-device
caching networks is considered.
Departing from these works and building on the model
introduced in [14], where the caching strategy was optimized
with respect to backhaul load minimization without any se-
crecy constraint, we consider in this paper a similar model
with secrecy requirements. We investigate in this paper two
fundamental eavesdropping models during the delivery phase.
Our main contributions are:
• We formally define the problem of secure caching at the
wireless edge for a HetNet scenario.
• We derive the secrecy conditions for two eavesdropper
models and the corresponding backhaul rate of a caching
scheme based on storing Maximum Distance Separable
(MDS) encoded packets, and we formulate the optimal
caching scheme as a convex optimization problem.
• We investigate the performance of the optimal secure
scheme for a relevant HetNet scenario.
• Our results show that the considerable impact of the
secrecy constraints on the performance of caching content
at the wireless edge.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define
our system model, caching scheme and performance measures.
In Section III, we derive the main theoretical results of the
paper. In Section IV we thoroughly investigate the perfor-
mance of our optimal schemes and we compare it to other
caching schemes in a heterogeneous network scenario. Finally,
Section V concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe our system model for hetero-
geneous networks. Moreover, we define the MDS encoded
caching schemes used in the secrecy problem.
A. Network Model
In the Heterogeneous Network illustrated in Fig. 1, U wire-
less users request files from a macro-cell base (MBS) station,
which has access to a library of N files F = {F1, . . . , FN}
of size B bits. Users request files stored in the library
according to a known popularity distribution, i.e., each file
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Fig. 1. Heterogeneous network.
Fj is requested with probability pj , and
∑N
j=1 pj = 1. In the
following, we denote the probability distribution vector of the
files by p = {p1, . . . , pN}.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, NSBS small-cell base stations (SBS)
are deployed in the coverage area of the MBS in order to
serve user requests within short distance. As long as a user
is within the coverage range r of the SBS, we assume the
content to be delivered without errors. Each SBS is equipped
with a cache able to store up to M < N complete files, i.e.,
the cache has size M ·B bits. Each user requesting for files in
F contacts all the SBSs in its coverage range, and it is initially
served by them. As a consequence, each user u ∈ {1, . . . , U}
can be served by multiple SBSs, where the number du of
SBSs serving the user depends on its location (see Fig. 3). In
particular, we call γi the probability for a user to be served by
du = i SBSs. If the user cannot collect enough information
to recover the requested file, the MBS is contacted to send
the missing data to the user, using the backhaul connection.
The topology of the overall network may vary during time.
However, at each instant t, the connection network can be
described as in Fig. 2.
B. MDS Codes for Caching
In a MDS(k, n) codes, k ≥ n encoded packets are created
such that any subset of n packets are necessary and sufficient
to recover the initial information. The most known example
of MDS codes are the Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. From a
security point of view, a useful property of these codes is that
if less than n packets are received, no part of the encoded
information can be retrieved. However, RS codes have a high
encoding and decoding complexity, which would lead to an
increase of the latency due to the decoding of the encoded
packets. Moreover, the MBS has to store n encoded packets
per file, or re-encode the needed packets at each request.
To solve the complexity problem, rateless codes can be used
instead [15]. Using rateless codes, any packet can be encoded
independently on the others, i.e., a new packet can be created
on the fly. Rateless codes are almost-MDS, i.e., any (1+ǫ)n set
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Fig. 2. Instantaneous HetNet with Secrecy Constraints.
of the k encoded packets are sufficient to recover the initial
information with high probability, with ǫ → 0 for k → ∞.
Rateless codes have low-complexity encoding and decoding,
and new encoded packets can be created by the MBS when a
new request is received. Moreover, it has be proven that only a
negligible part of the information can be retrieved if less than
n encoded packets are collected [16]. In the remainder of the
paper, we will use rateless codes, and it can easily be shown
that these codes constitute the worst-case scenario in terms of
secrecy performance compared to MDS codes.
C. Coded Caching Scheme
Formally, a caching scheme is constituted of two phases,
namely the placement phase and the delivery phase. In the
placement phase, which typically occurs at a moment with a
low amount of file requests, e.g. at night, the caches of the
SBSs are filled according to the placement strategy. In the
delivery phase, the users send requests to the MBS, and are
initially served by the SBSs covering their locations. If a user
does not receive enough information to recover the requested
file, the MBS is contacted to send the missing data.
In order to increase the efficiency of the caches, encoded
packets are stored instead full files. Hence, each file is split
into n fragments, i.e., Fj = {f (j)1 , · · · , f (j)n } for all 1 ≤ j ≤
N . Those fragments are used to create kj encoded packets
{e(j)1 , · · · , e(j)kj }. Each SBS receives mj different encoded
packets for each file Fj to be stored in its cache, with
m = [m1 · · ·mN ]. Formally, the proposed encoded caching
scheme is described the following:
1) Placement phase: The MBS creates kj = NSBSmj
encoded packets using a rateless code, sending mj of
them to each SBS.
2) Delivery phase: A user requesting file Fj contacts du ≥
1 SBSs, receiving mjdu disjoint encoded packets. If
mjdu ≥ n, the user can recover the file due to the MDS-
property of rateless codes. Otherwise, the MBS creates
and sends the remaining n − mjdu encoded packets.
Due to the MDS-property of rateless codes, the user
can recover the requested file, since innovative packets
are transmitted with high probability.
The secrecy placement problem consists of finding the
optimal number of packets mj of each file to be stored in
the caches in order to minimize the average backhaul rate,
which is defined as the average fraction of files that needs
to be downloaded from the MBS during the delivery phase,
according to secrecy constraints defined in the next section.
D. Optimal Caching with Rateless Codes
First we briefly review the average backhaul rate of the
proposed coded caching scheme without secrecy constraint.
Proposition 1 ( [14] Prop. 1). The average backhaul rate for
an encoded caching placement scheme CMDS
m
defined by the
placement m = [m1 · · ·mN ] can be calculated as
R(CMDS
m
) =
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj
(
1−min
(
1,
dmj
n
))
, (1)
where S ≤ NSBS is the maximum number of SBSs serving a
user.
Based on Proposition 1, the placement problem of MDS
encoded packets can be recast as an optimization problem.
Proposition 2 ( [14] Prop. 4). Finding the optimal MDS coded
placement scheme CMDS(opt) defined by m(opt) = [m1 · · ·mN ],
which minimizes the average backhaul rate R(CMDS
m
), is a
convex optimization problem:
min
q1,...,qN
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj(1 −min(1, dqj))
s.t.
N∑
j=1
qj = M (2)
0 ≤ qj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [1, N ]
where we define qj , mj/n in the remainder of the paper.
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Fig. 3. Small cells topology.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF MDS CODED CACHING
In this section we first describe the two models of eaves-
dropping attacks investigated in this paper. Then, we derive the
secrecy conditions for both eavesdropper scenarios S1 and S2.
Moreover we derive for each scenario the achievable backhaul
rate as a convex optimization problem.
We should first note that we restrict ourselves to eavesdrop-
ping attacks on the backhaul links and caches, i.e., we do not
consider the potential eavesdropping of wireless communica-
tions from the small-cell base stations to the mobile users.
This choice is justified by the fact that caching strategies are
independent from this eavesdropping model which is inherent
to the broadcast nature of wireless communications and has
been studied extensively for networks without caching, see
e.g. [10] and references therein. Hence in the following we
consider two different types of attackers compared to usual
wireless eavesdroppers. Both scenarios are depicted in Figure
2. First, we define the secrecy condition for the caching
heterogeneous network.
Definition 1. The caching network is said to be secure for a
scenario Si if for any eavesdropper ESi in that scenario, i.e.
for any MBS-to-SBS link in Scenario S1 and for any location
of ES2 in Scenario S2, ESi cannot recover any full file Fj ,
∀j.
We should note that both MDS and rateless codes fulfill
Definition 1 if fewer than n packets of a file are collected by
an eavesdropper.
A. Backhaul Eavesdropper - Scenario S1
In Scenario S1 we consider an eavesdropper ES1 which can
eavesdrop a single MBS-to-SBS link during the delivery phase.
In other words, any packet delivered by the MBS through the
corrupted link to the SBS is intercepted by ES1 .
For this scenario, we derive the secrecy condition and
corresponding achievable backhaul rate as follows. Here we
denote by Q the number of requests per SBS during the
delivery phase. Moreover, we assume that each SBS receives
the same amount of file requests during the delivery phase
(i.e., a geographic uniformity of requests). As a consequence,
the overall number of requests is given by Q¯ = QNSBS.
Proposition 3. The caching network is secure in the presence
of an eavesdropper ES1 if and only if
mj >
n
Qpj
· Qpj
∑I
d=1 γd − 1∑I
d=1 dγd
, j = 1, . . . , N, (3)
where I , min (S, ⌊n/mj⌋).
Proof: If we denote by Qj = Qpj the number of requests
for file Fj received by the SBS, an eavesdropper ES1 , i.e.,
on a single MBS-SBS link, can collect an amount of packets
which depends on the number of SBSs serving each request.
We denote by P that amount in the remainder of the proof.
With rateless codes, these packets are all different, hence
P < n is necessary to prevent the recovery of file k by
ES1 . Moreover, each request results in the transmission of
n(1 − min(1, dmj/n)) packets over the eavesdropped link
with probability γd. Hence, for j = 1, . . . , N , we have that
P =
∑S
d=1Qγdpjn(1 − min(1, dmj/n)). In order to find
a bound for mj , we notice that min(1, dmj/n)) = 1 if
d > n/mj , i.e., (1−min(1, dmj/n)) = 0 if d > n/mj . Hence
the condition P < n can be rewritten, for j = 1, . . . , N , as∑I
d=1Qγdpjn(1−dmj/n) < n, where I = min (S, ⌊n/mj⌋).
The result (3) follows from standard calculations.
In order to preserve the convexity of the optimization
problem, we focus on the worst-case attack scenario where
users can contact only one SBS, i.e., γ1 = 1.
Corollary 1. The caching network is secure in the presence
of an eavesdropper ES1 if
mj > n(1− 1/(Qpj)), j = 1, . . . , N. (4)
Combining Prop. 2 and Cor. 1 we can derive the optimiza-
tion problem for Scenario S1.
Proposition 4. Finding the optimal coded placement scheme
C(opt) in Scenario S1 defined by m(opt) = [m1 · · ·mN ], which
minimizes the average backhaul rate R(Cm), is a convex
optimization problem:
min
q1,...,qN
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj(1 −min(1, dqj))
s.t.
N∑
j=1
qj = M (5)
(
1− 1
Qpj
)+
< qj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [1, N ]
where qj = mj/n and (·)+ = max(·, 0).
According to Cor. 1, it is possible to get a lower bound for
the cache size.
Corollary 2. The cache size should satisfy the following
condition in order to guarantee secrecy in Scenario S1:
M > N − η
Q
, (6)
where η ,
∑N
j=1 1/pj .
Proof: Summing the N inequalities mj > n(1−1/(Qpj))
over all the N files, we get M > N − 1/Q∑Nj=1 pj , and the
corollary is obtained.
Intuitively, Cor.2 reflects the fact that with sufficient cache
size, fewer transmissions over the backhaul are needed, and
hence the system is better protected against an attacker ES1
able to wiretap the backhaul link. On the other hand, as we will
see in the following section, if the eavesdropper ES2 is instead
able to access the cache contents, it should be guaranteed that
not too many packets of the files are present in each cache.
B. Cache Eavesdropper - Scenario S2
In Scenario S2 we consider an eavesdropper ES2 which can
eavesdrop the content of the caches within coverage range.
Hence if the malicious mobile user ES2 can be served by
dES2 SBSs, then ES2 has access to the cache content of these
dES2 corrupted SBSs.
As in the previous section for Scenario S1, we derive the
secrecy condition and corresponding achievable backhaul rate
for this scenario.
Proposition 5. The caching network is secure in the presence
of an eavesdropper ES2 if and only if
mj <
n
S
, j = 1, . . . , N. (7)
Proof: The worst-case eavesdropper ES1 is within cov-
erage of S SBSs, from which it can collect mjS encoded
packets of file Fj . Since these mjS packets are all different
for the proposed caching scheme, the file Fj can only be if
mjS ≥ n.
By summing Equation (7) over the N files we obtain an
upper bound on the secure cache size.
Corollary 3. The cache size should satisfy the following
condition in order to guarantee secrecy in Scenario S2:
M < N/S. (8)
As mentioned previously, we observe that Cor. 3 implies
that the cache size is upper-bounded to guarantee secrecy
against an eavesdropper ES2 with access to the caches while
on the other hand Cor. 2 suggests that the cache size should
be higher than a certain threshold to guarantee secrecy against
a backhaul wiretapper ES2 . These observations will be further
analyzed in the numerical illustrations of Section IV.
Finally from Prop. 5 and Prop. 2 we can derive the opti-
mization problem for Scenario S2.
Proposition 6. Finding the optimal coded placement scheme
C(opt) in Scenario S2 defined by m(opt) = [m1 · · ·mN ], which
minimizes the average backhaul rate R(Cm), is a convex
optimization problem:
min
q1,...,qN
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj(1 −min(1, dqj))
s.t.
N∑
j=1
qj = M (9)
0 ≤ qj < 1/S ∀j ∈ [1, N ].
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section we investigate the performance of the pro-
posed caching scheme with secrecy constraints in terms of
backhaul rate in a HetNet topology of particular interest. The
presented numerical results can be generalized to any network
topology.
A. Network Topology
In the simulations, we consider the network illustrated in
Fig. 1, where the MBS has a coverage area R of radius D =
500 meters. NSBS = 316 SBSs are deployed in a regular grid,
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Fig. 4. Backhaul rate as a function of the library size with and without
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with horizontal distance equal to d = 60 meters. We call r,
with d/
√
2 ≤ r ≤ d, the radius of the coverage area of each
SBS. As a consequence, the coverage areas of neighbor SBSs
may overlap, as shown in the highlighted square of Fig. 3. We
calculate the probability a user has to be served by d SBSs as
γd =
ρdAd∑S
i=1 ρiAi
,
where Ad is the total area of R where a user can be served
by d SBSs and ρd is its average density. In the following, we
consider a uniform distribution of users over R, with density
ρd = ρ = 0.05 users/m
2
. This corresponds to U = 39, 269
mobile users present in the coverage area of the MBS. Finally,
the users request files according to a Zipf law of parameter α,
i.e.,
pj =
1/jα∑
j 1/j
α
,
where α represents the skewness of the distribution [17].
B. Numerical Results
In the following, we study the performance of the proposed
optimal cache placement with secrecy constraints. Unless
specified otherwise, the SBSs have a coverage area of r = 60
meters with a storage capacity of M = 20 files. The library
contains N = 200 files, whose popularity follows a Zipf
distribution of parameter α = 0.7, and have Q = 100 requests.
In Fig. 4 the backhaul rates R obtained for the eaves-
dropping scenarios S1 and S2 are compared with the optimal
caching placement without secrecy constraints as a function of
the size N of the library of files. As expected, the backhaul
rate grows with the library size N , since a smaller library
size means an higher cache hit probability. For small library
sizes, in the cache eavesdropper scenario it is possible to
better exploit the cache to decrease the rate, while for bigger
values of N the backhaul eavesdropper scenario converges to
the optimal one without secrecy. This fact can be intuitively
explained as follows: when N gets large, there are so many
files in the library that the probability that Qpj(n−mj) < n
tends to 1 as pj → 0 and hence the new constraint due
to Scenario S1
(
1− 1
Qpj
)+
< qj reduces to the constraint
without secrecy 0 < qj . For Scenario S2 the new constraint
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induced by the secrecy condition does not converge to the case
without secrecy when N gets larger, and therefore there is a
gap in terms of achievable backhaul rate.
In Fig. 5 the backhaul rates R of the proposed solutions are
calculated as a function of the range r of the coverage of the
SBSs. With a small coverage area, the SBSs have to store less
data in order to defend their caches from ES2 , so the backhaul
rate is high. However, an increase of coverage area means that
each cache can store fewer packets of each file, which favors
the optimization of the cache eavesdropper secure problem.
This is due to the fact that the additional constraint in this
scenario is an upper bound on the number of encoded packets
stored per file. A larger coverage area means that more users
can contact a large number of SBSs, and hence each SBS
needs to store fewer encoded packets of popular files, using the
cache to store a small number of packets of less popular ones.
On the contrary, ES1 can take advantage of the increase of the
coverage range, which corresponds to an augmentation of the
proportion of the files that are transmitted over the backhaul.
In this case, the additional constraint is a lower bound, hence
it is not possible to store fewer packets of popular files, and
the cache is not filled. However, the performance increases
slightly, since more files reach the lower bound.
In Fig. 6 we depict the backhaul rates R as a function of
the cache size M for both scenarios and without secrecy. We
observe that an increase of M improves the performance in
Scenario S2, since a larger cache size available means a larger
number of different files stored. Since the cache eavesdropper
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ES2 needs n packets to recover the data, if a small number of
encoded packets of less popular files are stored, ES2 cannot
recover anything. As a consequence, the difference from the
optimal caching scheme is due to the less popular files, which
are not stored. In practice, the SBSs store more packets of
popular files, which is sub-optimal from the backhaul rate
point of view, and do not store packets of less popular file.
This strategy is sub-optimal, but performs only slightly worse
than the optimal scheme. For Scenario S1, the cache is too
small to ensure security, so it is not used. As a consequence,
the backhaul rate remains 1, since the SBSs do not store any
packet. However, when the cache reaches the critical size,
the performance improves since the cache is filled. Thus,
caching in this scenario is useful only if a certain cache size
is available, as stated in Cor. 2.
Finally, in Fig. 7 we show the minimal required cache
size for guaranteeing secrecy for Scenario S1 as a function
of the number of requests Q. The blue lines depict the case
N = 100 while the red lines depict N = 200. As expected,
a larger cache size is required for secrecy against a backhaul
eavesdropper when N gets larger. Moreover we observe that
the minimal cache size Mmin is an increasing function of
Q, and that a smaller Zipf parameter α leads to a larger
threshold Mmin. In other term, if the popularity profile of
the files becomes uniform, i.e., α → 0 it becomes more
difficult to ensure secrecy. There is, however, an exception
to that behavior, namely for Q < N . In this case, the security
constraint of Prop.3 is verified for any M, in particular M = 0
already guarantees secrecy since the eavesdropper ES1 does
not intercept enough backhaul transmissions to decode a file.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of optimal MDS-encoded con-
tent placement at the cache-equipped small-cell base stations
at the wireless edge with secrecy constraints. We defined two
types of security threats in the caching network for which we
derived the secrecy conditions and the corresponding optimal
caching placement strategy based on rateless encoding. We
then thoroughly studied the secrecy performance of this opti-
mal placement for a relevant heterogeneous scenario scenario
by comparing it to the optimal placement without secrecy con-
cerns and by measuring the influence of the key parameters,
such as the capabilities of the small-cell base stations and
the library statistics. Our numerical observations, which can
easily be generalized to any geometric topology and number
of eavesdroppers, highlighted the impact of secrecy constraints
on cached content and showed the behavior of the system
depending on the type of attack. Further the crucial importance
of optimizing securely content placement was highlighted
since such an optimization yields a significant decrease of the
load of the network backhaul, i.e., a considerable decrease of
delay for secure delivery to the end users.
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